Maritime security and maritime safety cannot be separated from the world's maritime fulcrum policy. Policies relating to maritime security and safety are not only related to the Indonesian Navy but also involve other major components, reserve components and supporting components in the national defense system. Maritime defense requires policies, regulations, measures, and operations that are different from conventional national defense strategy. This research used qualitative design perspective validated through triangulation process. This research finds that the threats stretching from the West to East and from the North to South of Indonesia require synergy and integration of all components of the nation. Therefore, it is necessary to refocus policies, regulations, measures, and operations in the maritime defense system.
INTRODUCTION
Indonesia is the largest archipelagic country in the world with a coastline length of ± 81,000 km, and 17,499 islands consisting of 5,698 named islands and 11,801 unnamed/not yet named islands (Dewanti Lestari, 2015) . The concept of archipelagic state stipulated in the UN Convention on International Maritime Law (United Nations Convention on the Sea/UNCLOS) in 1982 was ratified by Law Number 17 of 1985 (Undang-Undang RI, 1985) . Territorially speaking, Indonesia has an area of national jurisdiction of ± 7.8 million km². ± 5.9 million km² or two thirds of Indonesia's national jurisdiction is ocean, 2.7 million km 2 of which is the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone (ZEEI) while the rest (± 3,2 juta km²) is the territorial sea, island waters and inland waters.
President Joko Widodo (2015) stated that the enforcement of maritime sovereignty is one of the main programs to realize Indonesia as a global maritime fulcrum ("Indonesia Sebagai Poros Maritim Dunia," 2015) . The concept of Global Maritime Fulcrum has been stated in Presidential Regulation No. 2 of 2015 concerning the 2015-2019 National Medium-Term Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional/RPJMN). In order to realize Indonesia as the global maritime fulcrum, the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, stated five main pillars of global maritime fulcrum policy, in which the fifth pillar is stated that the government will built a maritime defense power ("Indonesia Sebagai Poros Maritim Dunia," 2015) . In addition, the Government has issued Presidential Regulation Number 16 of 2017 (RI, 2017) concerning Indonesian Maritime Policy. In one of the 7 pillars it is determined that Indonesian maritime policy shall have a pillar related to defense and security. With this government policy, the words maritime and sea defense, which used to only be part of Indonesian Navy, become buzzwords among governmental institutions in Indonesia as well as the nongovernmental organizations. The aspect of national defense is in essence prepared in accordance with threats that can disrupt the process of prosperity. Welfare and safety (security) is inseparable. When something interferes with prosperity, it is called a threat, and when something interferes with security it is also called a threat. This view is the basis of the development of various strategies on trade, aggression, conquest, invasion, intervention, intimidation, diplomacy, negotiation, and various other patterns within the spectrum of peace and conflict (Buzan & Hansen, 2009) .
Indonesian territorial waters have long been a busy area crossed by foreign ships. Hundreds of boats and ships cross Indonesian waters every day through the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) as well as the Sea Lines of Oil Trade (SLOT) ("Kapushidrosal Tekankan Pentingnya Hidrografi Bagi Pembangunan Kelautan," 2018). The route used for trading is ALKI I, ALKI II, and ALKI III. The shipping route is a very strategic bargaining position in accelerating the global maritime fulcrum policy. If not managed properly, Indonesia's strategic position due to being sandwiched between two oceans and two continents will pose a threat to Indonesia by making it vulnerable to transnational crime. Therefore, strengthening aspects of national defense through Indonesian Maritime Policy becomes a necessity.
Another threat is the use of natural resources in the ocean that are carried out directly or by proxy. If we look back at the time of the Srivijaya Kingdom, the Kingdom of Malacca, the Kingdom of Samudera Pasai, and so on, this situation may cause internal conflict which resulted in division (devide et impera) (Hannigan, 2015) . Likewise in the regional and global context of medieval times, the sea exploration carried out by Vasco daGama or Colombus, which was originally an expedition mission to search for new natural wealth, eventually led to prolonged conflict and civil war in the region which later became colonization like in Latin America, Africa and Asia.
Likewise in Indonesia's historical perspective, policies related to maritime have been carried out long before the establishment of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The maritime fulcrum policy that is now promoted by the Government in Nawa Cita is not new, but rather an excavation of past history that can be used as a momentum for the glory of Indonesia's maritime return as in the case of European and Renaissance reforms in medieval Italy. On the other hand, for as long as Indonesia stands, the orientation of national defense was more focused on land defense. Thus building a national defense based on the combination of land-based and maritime-based as well as air-based is a key challenge in building a comprehensive national defense strategy and providing a deterrence effect.
Maritime defense is inseparable with air and land defense as the three are one part of the conception of Nusantara insight. Maritime defense with its complexity today certainly changes Indonesia's national defense paradigm, which used to be more land-based. The rapid changes in information and communication science and technology have added to the complexity of the problems in the maritime region because of the total national defense perspective as mandated in Law Number 3 of 2002 concerning National Defense (Undang-Undang RI, 2002) .
We should see the definition of maritime defense and security by Germond (2009) which covers four important aspects, namely: policy, regulation, measures, and operation (Germond & Smith, 2009 ). In accordance with existing policies, regulations, measures and operations, maritime defense is still a big question mark in maintaining the sovereignty of the country as a whole. The maritime fulcrum policy as the umbrella that covers maritime defense certainly requires the existence of a maritime defense policy, maritime regulation, a measure of the success of maritime fulcrum policy, and operations carried out by the main components of national defense against maritime threats. If the maritime fulcrum policy is faced with defense, it requires a change in the defense paradigm from land-based to maritimebased, while still maintaining land-based and air-based defense as inseparable and mutually-reinforcing components.
RESEARCH METHODS
This study uses a qualitative research design with a descriptive method. The literature review is carried out to validate the data through triangulation process. As explained in the background above, qualitative research design is used to find the true meaning of the paradigm of global maritime fulcrum policy towards Indonesian national defense. Kuhn defines paradigm as follows:
"A paradigm is made up general theoretical assumption and laws and techniques for their application that the members of particular scientific community adopt. …A paradigm will always be sufficiently imprecise and open-ended to leave of the kind of work be done."
The change in paradigm cannot be made so easily. Paradigm is a process that takes time and is carried out sustainably. To understand changes in thinking, there are two basic things, namely: changes about the theory adopted or agreed upon by experts; and an understanding of the sociological characteristics of the scientific community/experts in relation to changing attitudes. Science develops based on individual observations and how the individual interpret it. That is how a change in paradigm can occur.
The problem that Indonesia is facing with the existence of global maritime fulcrum policy is to realize maritime security and maritime safety. Historically, the term maritime security arose after the rise of marine fleet that can control sea territory and prevent the efforts of other parties to use the sea domain for its interests (sea denial). During the Cold War and up until the end of the era, the term maritime security was rarely used. However, the term maritime security today has re-emerged even though its definition has not yet reached an agreement (Germond, 2009) .
Maritime security as a maritime domain also includes maritime defense. Maritime defense at least fulfills several things as stated by Germond (2009: 1) , namely:
"Maritime security can be understood as a concept referring to the security of the maritime domain or as a set of policies, regulations, measures and operations to secure the maritime domain." Thus maritime defense can be said to have variables that are the same as maritime security, namely: policies, regulations, measures or indicators, and operations.
Research Framework
As a policy, Maritime Defense certainly requires a Maritime Strategy. Defining Maritime Strategy is quite complex (John B Hattendorf, 2000) . The historical development of maritime strategy is closely related to the development of navigation technologies and weaponry of its time. But now, maritime defense cannot be separated from maritime strategies. In a broader perspective, namely totality, maritime defense is an integral part of land defense and air defense. Maritime defense in terms of sea denial and sea control is a concept integrated with land and air defense. In other words, the maritime defense strategy is not only the power or strategy or even the weaponries of the Navy alone ("Information Research Service, A Foundation Paper on Australia's Maritime Strategy," n.d.). This strategy cannot be separated from the totality with air defense and land defense. Geographically speaking, in carrying out the global maritime fulcrum policy there needs to be an archipelagic defense maritime strategy which reflects the comprehensiveness and totality of maritime defense with policies, regulations, measures or indicators, and operations that still involve the main components, reserve components, and supporting components. The implementation of archipelagic maritime defense strategy can accelerate the global maritime fulcrum policy in terms of prosperity that is consistent with security. Based on the above theoretical studies, the framework of this paper is as can be seen in Figure 1 .
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The Maritime Defense Paradigm sine qua non global maritime fulcrum Maritime defense is related to threats originating from outside of Indonesia's territorial boundaries (Kemhan RI, 2015) . The development of international politics after the end of Cold War is no longer described as 'black' against 'white' or 'good' versus 'evil'. Even so, the international relations dynamic of an anarchic world (milieu), according to the structural realist perspective, will propel countries to prioritize survival due to the world structure drives them to do so (Mearsheimer, 2011) . For classical realists, survival is conducted in struggle for power or maintaining power (dominance) (Morgenthau, 1973) . The global maritime fulcrum policy is driven by China with the Maritime Silk Route which causes the United States to carry out a rebalancing power policy (Kartini, 2016) , as a follow-up to their containment policy, in facing China's assertive attitude. This is the manifestation of international structure which now prioritizes the ocean as part of the struggle for power.
With this fact, security issues remain inseparable from traditional security issues related to military issues (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998) . Even though the threat is not yet real, it is still assumed to be real for the national interests of the country. Buzan et. al. stated that with regard to measurements, facing threats with special nature of security threats shall require extraordinary measures in dealing with them. Thus the use of national defense forces has been legitimized and generally opens the way to mobilize and use special power. Traditionally, the state can declare a state of emergency to justify that it has the right to use various means to stop threats. In the context of maritime fulcrum policy, special strength is needed in maritime defense. In creating state security even in the global maritime fulcrum policy, it is still embedded with a political role due to the existence of political actors that is required to make decision on the threat, military grand strategy and how to use military power in general. Then under what circumstances can global maritime fulcrum policy provide a leverage in the total national defense strategy so that it will not become polarization and securitization in the global maritime fulcrum policy.
In creating an Indonesian maritime defense posture, it is necessary to look at the maritime security paradigm. Maritime security is an effort to improve maritime security carried out by deploying sea power that is able to reach the frontier/outermost islands, and is able to effectively maintain the sovereignty of the sea territory, and is directed at being able to monitor the security of the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. Meanwhile, increasing land security, the country's land border security, and the outermost small islands security is carried out through the enforcement of land forces that are effective in empowering defense areas. Indonesia builds a maritime defense posture that is related to one of the pillars of the development of a maritime fulcrum (Murniningtyas, 2016) .
The concept of Global maritime Fulcrum should be used as a geopolitical concept and Indonesia's modern maritime strategy as well as a step to find out the ideal "Fulcrum" concept for Indonesia and its influence on the concept of maritime defense. Martin Jones, Rhys Jones and Michael Woods stated that geopolitics is a multi-intersection between politics and geography (Jones, Jones, & Woods, 2004) . When viewed from this perspective, Indonesia's maritime defense with global maritime fulcrum policy requires a paradigm shift. The paradigm that used to be measured in 'black' or 'white' needs to become multidimensional.
Policy
Maritime development policies that focus on purely marine development to achieve prosperity will only lead to pillaging from other countries if it is not balanced by strengthening national defense. The government of Indonesia realizes global maritime fulcrum by building maritime highways for national development in the perspective of prosperity. In addition, the government is building 24 ports and 13 shipping routes for 41 ports that stretch from the Western to the eastern part of Indonesia (Lily Rusna Fajriah, 2017). The opening of shipping route from the west to the east of Indonesian region is in line with the potential threats that will enter from the western and eastern regions of Indonesia. Meanwhile, ALKI I, ALKI II, and ALKI III stretched across Indonesian territorial waters where the threat comes from north to south or vice versa, thus increasing the complexity of the threat. In this situation, the logical consequence is maritime defense also needs to be realized to complement the implementation of developmental programs to achieve sustainable prosperity. In other words, the global maritime fulcrum policy is also a momentum to strengthen maritime defense.
Regulation
For Indonesia, the sea has a very important meaning in addition to unifying the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) in accordance with UNCLOS 1982 , Law Number 17 of 1985 (Undang-Undang RI, 1985 , and Law Number 6 of 1996 (Undang-Undang RI, 1996)concerning Indonesian Waters. Now, with the existence of a global maritime fulcrum policy and the construction of maritime highways, the linkage between islands and the utilization of marine resources must be in line with the regulation on national defense. Regulations that are embodied in rules of law and legislation that can accelerate maritime development must not be separated with the interest of national defense because archipelagic state is Indonesia's geopolitical conception which creates multi-intersection with other fields including maritime defense. Regulations cannot merely open investment opportunities while ignoring maritime integrity as a whole unit with land territory and the airspace surrounding it. Change of mindset or paradigm is needed in developing regulations that integrate three dimensions at once namely sea, land, and air in each regulation issued by Ministries/Institutions/Agencies related to maritime fulcrum policies in the perspective of maritime development with a maritime defense perspective.
Measures
In Indonesian Maritime Policy it was stated that maritime defense and security is carried out by strengthening the weaponries owned by the Navy. Thus the strategy developed cannot be separated from the technology possessed by the Indonesian Navy warships. However, the Indonesian Navy alone with their modernized weaponries in implementing national defense is not the right answer given the state's total defense principle. In other words, the Navy will only get stronger if both land and air defense forces are also strengthened at the same time. On the other hand, with the rapid advancement of science and technology that has entered the fourth generation in developed countries, maritime defense technology also requires acceleration that does not depend on foreign technology. Shipping and weaponry technology requires the independence of national strategic industries to produce warships and their weapons independently because they are actually used for defense in their own home. Technology independence is also related to the ability of human resources to master foreign technology and then making it ours with support from the government and domestic defense industry.
Operation
In addition to the modern technology of shipping and weaponry, the strength of the Navy should be calculated by looking at the implementation of its functions, including military function, constabulary (punitive), and benign (security) (Corbett, 2009) The Constabulary task is a challenge and threat that occurs every year in Indonesian waters. Constabulary includes the following operations: Counterterrorism in the sea, arms smuggling, piracy in the sea, narcotics smuggling, protection of fishing fleets, protection from the exploration and exploitation of oil, natural gas, and so on in the sea, supporting maritime agreements that have been made, and maintaining peace in the sea (peace keeping). Benign task includes the following operations: assisting in natural disasters, prevention of illegal immigrants, peace-building, search and rescue, prevention of pollution in the sea, hydrographic surveys, underwater diving/rescue, etc. All of these shows a very broad dimension of tasking across institutions.
In modern maritime strategies, the key elements are sea denial, sea control, and power projection. Sea denial aims to prevent the use of a maritime area by opposing forces to confront a country within a certain period of time. Sea denial is more inclined to a more passive posture because it focuses on the defense aspect even though in reality there is also the use of offensive strength and ability. This is because the initiative actually lies with the opponent or the force that will attack using a maritime area. Sea control is a condition that exists when a country has the freedom to use a maritime area to achieve its objectives for a certain period of time, and prevent the use of the maritime area by its opponent. Maritime power through sea control and sea denial can form, influence and control the strategic environment, and send combat troops to the shore if necessary. Actual power projection is actually not included in the concept of maritime defense, but in the context of Indonesia it needs to be considered given that regional defense is carried out regionally.
Basically, military strategy is consisted of offense and defense, and to ensure its own survival. In the future, the Indonesian Navy should be able to control the sea area and islands in Indonesian waters with various efforts by integrating it with air and land forces. Units on land and coast must be able to protect vital objects. The ability to expel the possibility of attacks in the maritime area needs to be extended far into the vast ocean, to areas that allow the state to create a sphere of influence as part of its total defense system.
In reflection of the policies, regulations, measures/indications, and operations as described above, technology is the foundation that needs to be developed in developing an integrated national defense. The policies, regulations, measures, and operations as described above illustrate that the maritime fulcrum policies carried out in maritime development is still focusing on aspects of welfare and have not been accompanied by a maritime archipelagic defense strategy. We should learn from the lesson of Mandala Operation, in which Indonesia was known to having the strongest weaponries in Southeast Asia at the time, yet the warship led by Admiral Yos Sudarso was destroyed due to the weak communication system in a not-yetintegrated national defense. The lack of communication systems between defense equipment (interoperability) at that time caused weak air protection. Likewise, operations carried out by land forces as the manifestation of force projection also experienced problems due to the limited communication system and technology it possessed. Operations carried out by warships cannot be separated from existing bases in order to maintain operational logistics. Land defense is an important factor for synergy with air defense and maritime defense.
Changing the paradigm is not an easy work. Changing defense paradigm by raising the importance of maritime defense that is integrated with land and air defense requires acceleration and synchronization because the essence is multi-intersection. In order to adapt with the constantly developing dynamics of threat, global maritime fulcrum policy needs to be implemented by refocusing policies, regulation, measures and operation through multi-intersection. Defense and maritime security is a series of policies, regulations, measures, and operations that are continuously carried out, understood, and reviewed by all components of the nation in accordance with their respective authorities. In principle, the total national defense system in a modern state is carried out by formulating general state defense policies that involve awareness and responsibility of various parties (multi-intersection). The development of the national defense posture is not only the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces, especially the Indonesian Navy, but is the responsibility of all components because the paradigm of archipelagic defense strategy is a multi-intersection of maritime defense.
CONCLUSION
The maritime fulcrum policy that is only directed for the interest of increasing welfare will, at the same time, opens up opportunities for threats that stretch from the West to East of Indonesia and from the North to South of Indonesia. Dealing with this threat shall require synergy and integration of all components of the nation. Thus it is necessary to refocus policy, regulation, measures, and operations in the maritime defense system. Maritime defense requires at least four indicators, namely policy, regulation, measures, and operation. When talking about policy, it is directly related to the milieu surrounding the state's territory. The regulation is the same, because regulations can guarantee the ongoing maritime security and maritime safety. In terms of measures it is necessary to provide measurements that can be made for the realization of sea control, sea denial, and force projection. In implementing sea control and sea denials, strategies in operations become important so that maritime supremacy can be achieved which ultimately leads to maritime sovereignty. Indonesia's national defense strategy is total in nature as stipulated in Law Number 3 of 2002 (Undang-Undang RI, 2002), hence that maritime domain is not only the responsibility of the Navy. With the advancement of information and communication technology today, maritime defense cannot be separated from the aspects of air defense and land defense as an integrated unit. The defense paradigm of Indonesia as the largest archipelagic country must be able to develop and synergize all components (multi intersection in the archipelagic defense strategy) which involves all components of the nation in accordance in a total manner.
